Week 3 was full of interesting coaching decisions and the fallout of those calls. There are basically three types of calls chronicled here: calls where coaches took a risk and it paid off, calls where the coach took a risk, it failed, but they won anyways, and situations where the coaches went risk averse, the situation went well, but the end result was a loss. First, a gutsy call by Matt LaFleur at Lambeau
Packers Author Incredible Fourth Quarter Comeback
They’re gutsy if they work and dumb if they don’t. When to go for two has been questioned since the two-point conversion was instituted in 1994, though conventional wisdom has shifted somewhat when it comes to going for two when down by 8 points post-TD late in the game. Until 2017, teams almost always went for 1 when down 8, to bring the deficit to 7, to open up the possibility of getting the late TD and sending the game to OT. The thinking has shifted in recent years, in line with this chart:
The Packers were faced with a 17-0 deficit in the fourth quarter of their game against the Saints this weekend. Following a field goal to make the score 17-3 with 11:00 left, the Packers were able to force a punt and follow that with a quick touchdown with 6:58 remaining to bring the score to 17-9. Packers coach Matt LaFleur went for two, which was successful, to make the score 17-11. This is the advantage of going for two – now if the Packers score another touchdown, they just need the extra point kick to win it (and can still go to OT if they miss). That’s just what Green Bay did as they forced a quick three-and-out and once again marched down the field for a touchdown with 2:58 left. With the made extra point, the Packers were now in the lead at 18-17. The Saints were actually able to march back down the field to set up a game winning field goal, but Blake Grupe missed a 46 yard field goal to give the Packers the victory. LaFleur has been burned by going safe in the past, so perhaps this is a matter of learning your lesson as you move on.
Like LaFleur in 2021, Josh McDaniels Takes Some Points When More Are Needed
And perhaps one Raiders coach Josh McDaniels would’ve been wise to learn himself. With the Raiders trailing the Steelers 23-15 late in the fourth quarter, McDaniels opted to take the points not once, but twice in the late-game drive. The first attempt was on a 4th and 6 from the 30 with 3:11 left. That attempt was good, but was nullified by a Steelers penalty for leverage (Steelers player used a Raider for leverage to help his jump to try to block the kick). Then, with 2:25 left on a 4th and 4 from the Steelers 8 yard line, they attempted yet another kick, which was successful. The Raiders were able to subsequently get the ball back, but with only :12 remaining, and an interception on the first play ended their chances before it really got started.
There’s actually reason to believe the Raiders would’ve been better off declining the leverage penalty and taking the points then, than to proceed and kick the FG later on. All else being equal, the Steelers would’ve needed to run at least one more play before the 2:00 warning and if the circumstances were the same in the Steelers’ drive, the Raiders would’ve had an additional 50-60 seconds with which to work with. Alas, that is not how it all worked out. Coaches are generally very risk averse, and will bank on their defense doing their job more often than not. Which makes things all the more interesting and/or confusing when a coach very openly takes risks.
0-2 Teams Play Hot Potato with a Game
In the last two minutes, the Chargers and Vikings participated in a game of Hot Potato, with the last person holding the ball getting the win. Of course, two 0-2 teams have their reasons for being 0-2, and while the game was entertaining, there are significant issues for each team to address.
First to the Chargers. The Chargers were faced with a 4th-and-1 on their own 24 yard line with a 28-24 lead, on the good side of the two-minute warning (for them) and the Vikings were all out of timeouts. Given these factors, and Brandon Staley’s penchant for risk-taking, the Chargers decided to go for it – a first down guaranteed a win as the Chargers would go into victory formation with the Vikings unable to further stop the clock. A stop meant the Vikings would have good field position needing a TD to win. Justin Herbert handed the ball off to Joshua Kelley (who was lined up as a fullback), only for Kelley to get stuffed by the Vikings defense.
It should be noted, the quants are on Staley’s side here:
With an estimated 73% chance of success and a 100% chance to win if successful, you can understand the logic, if not the process*. The process, though, was questionable at best. The Chargers had run the ball 14 times for 30 yards in the game prior to this play, but had passed the ball 48 times for 445 yards (on 41 completions). The decision to take the ball out of the hands of their best player and into the hands of an underperforming second-string RB deserves a significant amount of scrutiny but, fortunately for the Chargers, the Vikings were unable to cash in.
With :41 left, the Vikings had a 4th and 4, which they converted with :35 on the clock. The Vikings sounded their first down horn and the fans went crazy; for the players on the field, this was a bad thing, as Kirk Cousins was unable to hear the play call while time ticked down. So Cousins did what any rational person would do in that situation, he PANICKED! he drew up a play in the dirt and fired a pass to his TE in tight coverage, resulting in a tipped ball and interception to end the game. The clock running down wasn’t as bad as the decision to wing it – would it have been better for Cousins to clock the ball with :14 instead of running the play, then allowing for three more chances to win the game from the Chargers’ 6 yard line? Thinking on the fly is a tough ask, given the circumstances, and this is a scenario that will certainly be practiced in the future, but it does seem like the worst possible outcome happened here at least in part due to poor planning. For two team accustomed to losing games in their strangest imaginable ways, it was an ending that was on brand for each franchise.
* [In fact, some models will advise you to ALWAYS go for it on 4th and 1, regardless of the situation and position on the field (up to and including your own 10 yard line).]
Did Justin Fields Really Need to Come Back Into That Game?
Early in the fourth quarter of the blowout in Kansas City, Fields scrambled for a three yard gain when he was, ahem, tackled by LB Willie Gay. After the play, DJ Moore spotted Fields walking erratically and got the attention of the officials and the Bears to pull him from the game so he could be checked out.
The Bears were on fourth down, so they kicked the field goal; when they got the ball again, put Fields directly back into the game. Coach Matt Eberflus was quite direct in his response, stating Fields had been cleared to return, so he did. Question is, should they? Even with the field goal, the score was 41-3 for the Chiefs with little to play for – even if he was cleared and didn’t have a concussion, why not replace him (and the other starters for that matter).
With the Bears starting 0-3 and everyone’s job is on the line, including Fields but also (and maybe especially) Eberflus – he’s now 3-17 as head coach, his new defensive coordinator resigned under somewhat dubious circumstances, and Fields has clearly regressed from 2022. While playing Nathan Peterman in an NFL game is almost never advisable, playing the starters either all game or very deep into the game seems indicative of a coach who is really under pressure to solve the issues and hoped more reps would solve the woes of the team. However, this appears to be another example of how Eberflus is outmatched as head coach. Fortunately for him, a musician attended the game which resulted in everyone in sports media turning into gossip columnists and ignoring anything even partially relevant to football. Unfortunately for him, musicians don’t care about 0-3 teams so they’ll again be focused on (bad) football.
Maybe Nathaniel Hackett Wasn’t So Bad
Ok, let’s not go that far, but the Sean Payton era is off to a horrendous start. There were no controversial calls here but this is obviously a way to shoehorn the Dolphins historic day into this report. The Broncos 0-3 start is a good reminder to not bury your predecessor if at all possible, as things may have been bad but they can always get worse. Then again, can’t imagine things getting much worse than yesterday: the Broncos absolutely folded on Sunday, giving up 726 yards (!!!!) and 70 points (!!!!) to the Dolphins. The 70 points was the most since 1966 and just three off the all-time record, the 726 yards allowed was the most since 1951 when the Rams put up 735 yards in their defeat of the New York Yanks. While it might seem unfair for an NFL team to beat up on a baseball team, one has to wonder if the Broncos would’ve fared better with Aaron Judge and Giancarlo Stanton on their defensive line than they did with their actual players.
For Miami, the buzz surrounding their offense turned into a roar over the weekend, with pundits now talking up their Super Bowl chances with breathless abandon. The one issue the team had last year (aside from nearly killing Tua Tagovailoa with their O-line), was their run game, but it appears to be much better this year with their two-headed attack of Raheem Mostert and De’Von Achane. The Dolphins rushed for 350 yards, while Mostert and Achane tallied four touchdowns EACH.
So what all of this seems to be pointing at, is that taking calculated risks is generally a wise approach, as long as it’s calculated, and as long as you can live with the negative outcomes. As the saying goes, Fortune Favours the Brave!